



# **Current Status of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Animal**



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# Outlines

- **Updated situation of HPAI in Asia**
- **FAO's views on current problems**
- **Perspectives on future approach**



# Updated situation of HPAI in Asia




# Updated situation of HPAI in Asia during the last 3 months






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


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


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




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## Mongolia:

Beginning of October, bird die off were reported in Ulaanbaatar. **No official info about the cause was reported.**






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## Myanmar:

21 Nov, H5N1 outbreak was reported in Kyang Tong, Shan State affecting chicken and ducks. It was reported to be related with imported ducks from China.






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## Thailand:

20 Nov, unusual mortalities were reported in Nakornsawan and Chiang Rai. It was confirmed by authority to be negative to HPAI.






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## Viet Nam:

18-23 Nov, H5N1 outbreaks were confirmed in Cao Bang and Quang Tri Provinces. Ducks were mainly affected.

Massive mortality in chicken have been reported in Tien Giang and Long An Provinces.






# **FAO's views on current problems**




# Updated situation of HPAI in Asia during the last 3 months



# HPAI outbreaks : Outbreaks reported in poultry and cases in wild birds

## Three Years Period (2004 - 2006)



This map represents occurrences of HPAI observed from January 2004 to November 2006. H5 cases are represented in this map only for countries in which H5N1 is known to be endemic and where N-subtype characterization is not being performed for secondary cases. Countries with HPAI occurrence only in wild birds are not considered as infected according to OIE status. The original data have been collected and aggregated at the most detailed administrative level and for the units available for each country. NOTE: FAO compiles information from numerous sources (FAO representatives or country missions, FAO reports, OIE, official government sources, EC, Reference laboratories and others) and produces these composite maps in a representative effort to provide full and accurate information. Omissions and errors are regretted, but FAO welcomes messages to that effect with supporting documentation to make the required changes based on FAO validation and verification procedures. Send messages to [EMPRES-livestock@fao.org](mailto:EMPRES-livestock@fao.org)



# Situation of HPAI

- Improvement of the situation compared to that of 2004
  - Less problem: number and size of outbreaks
  - Better preparedness due to
    - Improved capacity to contain the outbreaks
    - Better awareness
- But the virus is still circulating in Asia
  - Endemic VS Sporadic occurrence
- Recurrence and reintroduction of the virus in countries or regions





# After 3 years of the crisis Not un-common to see the following activities



**Movement and trading increases chance of disease spread at domestic level and cross-border.**



## After 3 years of the crisis Not un-common to see the following activities



**Some activities and practices may even increase human risks.**



# **More complications with cross-border trade related to HPAI**

- **Shifting of investment in poultry production:**
  - Ban of production in certain countries
- **Movement of vehicles and equipment (crates, egg trays)**
- **Trading not only poultry but sometimes medicine**
  - **Illegal importation of HPAI vaccines**
    - May complicate the HPAI control program in the country



# In reality ???

- Short-term training/study tour without following up activities does not sustain
- Limited animal health personnel to be trained
- Maintenance of sophisticated facilities/equipment/supplies/activities may not be possible after funding support
  - test kits VS conventional procedures
- Capacity of disease detection can be improved but transparency is up to the policy



# Perspectives on future approach



# For a longer term

- **Build capacity from the bottom-line:**
  - Increase the number of animal health personnel
  - **Veterinary education and specialization**
    - International Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians
    - Post-graduate training
    - Possible only with medium-term support
- **More investment on system (SOPs, mechanism, legislation framework)**
- **Practical and affordable facilities/procedures should be introduced**
- **Government's commitment to maintain:**
  - Human resource
  - Activities



**Transparency needs to start from  
sincerity and trust**



Thank you very much  
for your attention